A POS Tagging Approach to Capture Security Requirements within an Agile Software Development Process by Tetmeyer, Annette Marie
A POS Tagging Approach to Capture Security 
Requirements within an Agile Software Development 
Process 
Annette Tetmeyer 
Submitted to the graduate degree program in Electrical 
Engineering and Computer Science and the Graduate 
Faculty of the University of Kansas in partial 
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master 
of Science.  
Committee Members: ________________________ 
 Dr. Hossein Saiedian 
 Professor and Thesis Adviser 
 
 
 ________________________ 
 Dr. Arvin Agah 
 Professor 
 
 
 ________________________ 
 Dr. Prasad Kulkarni 
 Associate Professor 
 
 Date Defended ___________ 
 
ii 
 
The thesis committee for Annette Tetmeyer certifies that this is the approved version 
of the following thesis: 
 
 
A POS Tagging Approach to Capture Security Requirements 
within an Agile Software Development Process 
 
Committee Members: ________________________ 
 Dr. Hossein Saiedian 
 Professor and Thesis Adviser 
 
 
 ________________________ 
 Dr. Arvin Agah 
 Professor 
 
 
 ________________________ 
 Dr. Prasad Kulkarni 
 Associate Professor 
 
 
 
 Date Approved ___________ 
 
iii 
 
Abstract 
Software use is an inescapable reality.  Computer systems are embedded into devices 
from the mundane to the complex and significantly impact daily life. Increased use 
expands the opportunity for malicious use which threatens security and privacy.  
Factors such as high profile data breaches, rising cost due to security incidents, 
competitive advantage and pending legislation are driving software developers to 
integrate security into software development rather than adding security after a 
product has been developed. Security requirements must be elicited, modeled, 
analyzed, documented and validated beginning at the initial phases of the software 
engineering process rather than being added at later stages.  However, approaches to 
developing security requirements have been lacking which presents barriers to 
security requirements integration during the requirements phase of software 
development. In particular, software development organizations working within short 
development lifecycles (often characterized as agile lifecycle) and minimal resources 
need a light and practical approach to security requirements engineering that can be 
easily integrated into existing agile processes. 
In this thesis, we present an approach for eliciting, analyzing, prioritizing and 
developing security requirements which can be integrated into existing software 
development lifecycles for small, agile organizations.  The approach is based on 
identifying candidate security goals, categorizing security goals based on security 
principles, understanding the stakeholder goals to develop preliminary security 
requirements and prioritizing preliminary security requirements. The identification 
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activity consists of part of speech (POS) tagging of requirements related artifacts for 
security terminology to discover candidate security goals. The categorization activity 
applies a general security principle to candidate goals.  Elicitation activities are 
undertaken to gain a deeper understanding of the security goals from stakeholders.  
Elicited goals are prioritized using risk management techniques and security 
requirements are developed from validated goals. Security goals may fail the 
validation activity, requiring further iterations of analysis, elicitation, and 
prioritization activities until stakeholders are satisfied with or have eliminated the 
security requirement. Finally, candidate security requirements are output which can 
be further modeled, defined and validated using other approaches.  A security 
requirements repository is integrated into our proposed approach for future security 
requirements refinement and reuse.  We validate the framework through an industrial 
case study with a small, agile software development organization. 
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1 Introduction 
Software security is a complex, evolving problem that has only recently begun to 
receive additional attention.  One area that has previously received less attention is 
building security into software (Mead, Hough, & Stehney II, 2005) rather than 
correcting security flaws after release.  Integrating security requirements into the 
software development life cycle (SDLC) from the start can significantly improve 
software security and reduce rework at later stages.  However, traditional SDLC 
processes tend to focus attention on functional requirements leaving non-functional 
requirements, such as security, as an aside or afterthought.  Current processes exist to 
aid the development of security requirements, but these processes have several 
drawbacks when security goals are vague or difficult for stakeholders to quantify.  In 
particular, small software development teams have not only limited personnel 
resources, but may also be working within shorter time frames than large scale 
software development projects.  The need to balance resources for fast paced software 
development projects and to remain competitive in the market has influenced the shift 
from traditional to agile development processes (Boehm, 2002).  Therefore, there is a 
need for a security requirements approach to aid small, agile development 
organizations with the elicitation and development of security requirements when 
stakeholders have a difficulty explicitly expressing software security needs. The 
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approach must be easy to implement, efficient and reusable regardless of the 
development style followed by an organization. 
 Problem Statement 1.1
A hurdle to eliciting security requirements is the difficulty stakeholders and software 
engineers have in explicitly expressing security needs.  Stakeholders involved with 
requirements development will have varying levels of awareness, education and 
training related to security.  Business goals generally represent desired functionality, 
but may also imply general security needs.  The software requirements engineer must 
be skilled in eliciting functional and non-functional requirements, but in small 
organizations, education and resources to develop requirements may be lacking.  
Small organizations may also be drawn to agile development processes due to the 
desire to produce software quickly while responding to customer needs (Peeters, 
2005; Savolainen, Kuusela, & Vilavaara, 2010).  For this work, we are focusing on 
small, agile organizations. These organizations need to balance resources effectively 
and are not likely to have devoted resources to expertly guide the development of 
security requirements. Therefore, there is a need to discover and extract implied 
security goals from existing requirements artifacts in order to develop security 
requirements.  This thesis proposes a unique approach to capture security 
requirements within an agile software development process by utilizing part of speech 
(POS) tagging, analysis tools and a security requirements repository.   
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 Significance 1.2
Security has predominately been an afterthought to the software development 
process. Functional requirements are developed at the beginning of the process, but 
non-functional requirements such as security are often overlooked.  This results in 
security requirements that are “bolted on” (McGraw, 2005) later in the development 
cycle or worse, after the product has been released in response to security events, 
market response or regulatory demands.  Adding requirements at later stages of 
development significantly impacts project cost.  As security requirements become 
integrated, software product quality is expected to improve and rework due to 
security requirements added later in the process should decrease.  However, existing 
security requirement approaches have drawbacks.  Modeling tools such as misuse 
cases, abuse cases, and attack trees assume that security goals have already been 
identified and are used to refine security requirements.  Methodologies may be useful 
when developing comprehensive security development best practices and policies, but 
do not focus specifically on security requirements.  Other approaches specifically 
address the development of security requirements, but can be cumbersome and 
lengthy for agile development teams.   
The reasons for the lack of attention to software security are many.  Software 
engineers and stakeholders may lack general security awareness and education.  
Project constraints may focus resources on delivering functional requirements leaving 
non-functional requirements such as security a lower priority.  In other cases, 
decisions about security may simply have been made based on the technology 
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capabilities at the time.  Consider the development of supervisory control and data 
acquisition (SCADA) systems that manage power plants and public utilities.  Early 
infrastructure systems were not networked and reachable by the outside world to the 
degree that they are today.  Physical security was more important than system 
security and specific system security requirements were either limited or undefined. 
As awareness of system vulnerabilities increased, security requirements and 
mechanisms were added to existing systems on an ad hoc basis.  
Software security vulnerability awareness increased not only for critical 
system software, but also for common software that impacted the general public.  
Highly publicized data breaches, such as the 2003 theft of over 45 million credit and 
debit card data from T.J. Maxx (Jewell, 2007), increased awareness among the 
general public.  Legislation at the state and federal level has also been increasing as 
the need for privacy and security becomes apparent.  Some legislation has been long-
standing, such as the Privacy Act of 1974, but additional legislation has recently been 
enacted.  Privacy and security rules for the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA) were enacted at the federal level in 2003
1
.  Nearly all 
states have enacted either security
2
 or data breach
3
 notification legislation.   
Vulnerability awareness also drove increased security awareness among software 
engineers who frequently turned to implementing security mechanisms in order to 
                                                 
1
 http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/ 
2
 http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/telecom/overview-security-
breaches.aspx 
3
 http://datalossdb.org/us_states 
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mitigate risk.  However, this does not address the core problem that security 
requirements need to be built into software from the start, not addressed later.  
Small organizations with fewer than twenty people on the development team 
are likely to operate with limited resources.  A single person may be responsible for 
multiple roles, such as performing both quality engineer and tester roles.  A single 
security engineer may be available, but it is unlikely that a security engineering team 
exists.  For agile organizations, development will be iterative and extensive 
documentation will be less valuable than developing a working product
4
.  
Development schedules are likely to be shorter placing increased emphasis on project 
cost and time constraints.  Therefore, integrating security requirements into the 
software development process for small, agile organizations requires careful 
balancing of project resources and constraints.  
Increasing security threats, lack of software engineering security skills, 
consumer expectations for secure software and project constraints for small, agile 
organizations demonstrates the need to improve security requirements engineering.  
The increased complexity and integration of systems increases attack surfaces and 
makes it difficult to understand software vulnerabilities. Software engineers 
traditionally do not receive adequate training or attention to security to address 
software vulnerabilities.  Publicity of the latest data breach or widespread virus now 
makes front page news.  In addition, introducing project requirements strain limited 
project resources in terms of cost, time and personnel. Traditional software 
                                                 
4
 http://agilemanifesto.org/ 
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development processes have focused on cost and time constraints which leave little 
room for additional requirements development. Software companies now realize that 
software security creates a competitive advantage to market their products (Barnum 
& Sethi, 2006; Devanbu & Stubblebine, 2000).   
Security requirements can no longer be ignored.  The increasing number of 
software security threats combined with general security awareness means that 
software security is no longer an additional feature, but an expectation.  Consider the 
analogy of bank security.  A customer walking into a bank has an assumed 
expectation of security.  They expect security via safes, locks, guards, and identity 
verification.  These basic security devices are easy to understand and can be 
verbalized regardless of technical expertise.  There are likely to be additional security 
devices in place at a bank, but understanding these devices requires additional 
technical expertise that the average customer does not possess.  While customers do 
explicitly request all elements of banking security, they express their requirements by 
choosing the bank with a combined fee and security structure that balances their 
needs.  Consumers of software have similar security appetites.  Security may again be 
expected, but verbalizing specific security requirements may be difficult due to a lack 
of understanding.  It is difficult to elicit security requirements without the aid of those 
experienced with software security.  Justifying additional costs for security, in terms 
of time or money, can be a difficult sell since they are non-functional requirements.  
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Figure 1.1:  Security Requirements Elicitation Approach 
 
We propose a security requirements elicitation approach that is part of the 
requirements elicitation phase (see Figure 1.1).  Preliminary functional requirements 
artifacts are used as inputs and draft security requirements are output.  Although not 
part of the approach, draft security requirements can be then modeled, defined and 
validated as part of the final software requirements specification (SRS).  The security 
requirements elicitation approach activities are defined as follows: 
 Identify candidate security goals 
 Categorize security goals based on security principle 
 Understand stakeholder goals and develop preliminary security 
requirements 
 Prioritize preliminary security requirements 
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An overview of the security requirements elicitation approach is shown in Figure 1.2. 
The tasks comprising our proposed approach are discussed in Chapter 3. 
 
Figure 1.2: Security Requirements Elicitation Approach 
 
 Research Methodology 1.3
The security requirements elicitation approach was evaluated and validated using an 
empirical research methodology.  Existing software requirements approaches were 
studied to understand the current state.  Best practices, frameworks, methodologies, 
models and elicitation techniques were examined to determine applicability to a 
small, agile organization.  Next, a small, agile software development organization 
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was studied.  Observations regarding organizational roles, agile development 
processes and security requirements development practices were made.  These 
observations combined with the study of software requirements approaches formed 
the basis for areas to be addressed by the proposed solution.  A unique approach using 
part of speech tagging, analysis tools and a security requirements repository were 
modeled for the approach.  Activities, roles and sample artifacts were developed.  
Next, the approach was experimentally evaluated with representative organizations.  
The experimental results were evaluated in order to validate the effectiveness of the 
approach solution. 
 Thesis Organization 1.4
This thesis is organized into the following chapters:  
 Chapter 1: Introduction – The background of the problem, significance, and 
research methodology for the solution. 
 Chapter 2: Previous Work – A survey of software security requirements 
approaches. 
 Chapter 3: Security Requirements Elicitation Approach – POS tagging, 
security requirements repository and activities for the security requirements 
elicitation approach.  
 Chapter 4: Research Results Evaluation and Validation – The security 
requirements elicitation approach evaluation and validation. 
 Chapter 5: Conclusion – Conclusion and recommendations for future 
research.  
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2 Survey of Software Security 
Requirements Approaches 
Approaches to software security requirements engineering are evolving to address the 
lack of integration into existing development processes.  General software 
requirements engineering methods have evolved over time, but little research focuses 
on the specific aspect of software security requirements.  Given that attention to 
software requirements has been studied and shown to be beneficial to project budget 
and defect reduction (Mead & Stehney, 2005), additional attention to software 
security requirements should also prove beneficial. 
Security is traditionally classified as a non-functional requirement and many 
of the approaches for developing security requirements have roots in software quality 
(Haley, Laney, Moffett, & Nuseibeh, 2008; Mead & Stehney, 2005).  Improved 
quality leads to reduced defects and lower software development costs if conducted 
early in the development process (Mead & Stehney, 2005).  If a software product is 
not secure, it can be seen as defective.  A secure software product may therefore been 
seen as of higher quality if it has fewer security defects. Quality and security are also 
similar in that defining each in terms of a software product can be challenging.  
Security, like quality, is in the eye of the beholder. 
Quality and security defects are similar in that a tradeoff analysis may 
determine acceptable levels (i.e., the level of acceptable quality or security).  A key 
difference between quality and security is that quality defects can be viewed as 
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unintentional whereas security defects are the result of intentional action or inaction.  
A business would rarely intentionally produce a product or service that is seen as 
having a quality defect if they wish to remain in business.  On the other hand, security 
defects may not be addressed during development due to prioritization of 
requirements that do not leave room for addressing security issues.  Other security 
defects may simply not be known to the stakeholders and are therefore 
unintentionally omitted.  An attacker specifically targets a security defect for some 
malicious purpose. Software engineers do not intentionally introduce defects into 
software, yet about half of defects leading to security vulnerabilities found in today’s 
software are actually attributable to flaws in architecture and design (Allen, Barnum, 
Ellison, McGraw, & Mead, 2008). Security vulnerabilities tend to be the result of the 
ad-hoc nature of incorporating security into the development process rather than 
taking a proactive approach from the beginning of the process (Malone & Siraj, 
2008). 
A lack of education and understanding are contributing factors to the ad-hoc 
nature of incorporating security requirements into software.  Generating software 
security requirements can be difficult given that it is necessary to have a “black hat” 
mentality (i.e., thinking like an attacker) when maliciously exploiting a vulnerability. 
Requirements are derived based on what a software product should do, not what it 
should not do. In order to derive good security requirements, software engineers must 
be educated and experienced in all aspects of software security. However, in practice, 
this may not necessarily be the case since education in security is often lacking 
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(Barnum & Sethi, 2006; Viega, 2005) and a “security by obscurity” (Barnum & Sethi, 
2006; Mercuri & Neumann, 2003) mentality persists among software engineers. 
Hiding or attempting to obscure software flaws in the hope that attackers will not find 
them is a poor approach to security. Educating software engineers to think like an 
attacker will improve the proactive integration of security requirements into the 
software development lifecycle.   
Abuse cases, misuse cases, attack trees and security patterns are approaches 
designed to develop “black hat” thinking among software engineers and stakeholders.  
Developing misuse and abuse cases is an example of an approach that aids both 
software engineers and users to see beyond expected use in order to develop security 
requirements. The case approach encourages user input and aids all stakeholders with 
visualizing different scenarios.  Attack trees and security patterns are different 
approaches to visualize scenarios but are presented in a different manner.  All of these 
approaches encourage user input and interaction with software engineers which is 
critical when eliciting and developing software requirements.  User security 
awareness should also improve when these approaches are implemented.  Users 
expect security, but have difficulty defining security and should not be the sole source 
of developing security requirements. Broadly, users may define security requirements 
as meeting state and federal regulations or upholding company policies without a 
clear idea of what the regulations or policies entail. Therefore, the “black hat” 
approaches that software engineers use can aid users in defining security 
requirements.  
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Another tactic that may be followed is to test security into software products 
(McGraw, 2005).  Although not an ad-hoc approach, testing security into software is 
certainly not a proactive approach either. Traditionally, testing in software 
development life cycles occurs near the end of the project.  If security flaws are 
uncovered during testing, significant rework may be required, especially if testing is 
in the later stages of development.  Even agile organizations which integrate testing 
throughout the development lifecycle will experience rework if security requirements 
are discovered during testing rather than being specified at the start.  In fact, security 
cannot conclusively be proven through testing regardless of the development process 
(McGraw, 2005).  For example, how is it possible to conclusively test against the 
unauthorized disclosure of information?  If security cannot be “tested in”, security 
requirements must be developed along with functional requirements in order to meet 
stakeholder goals. 
To understand the current nature of software security requirements 
approaches, best practices, enumerations, frameworks, methodologies, elicitation 
techniques and models were studied.  Best practices and enumerations range from 
very broad activities to focusing on specific solutions. Frameworks and 
methodologies expand the view and begin addressing the security requirements 
process as a whole.  Elicitation techniques focus on defining or drawing out key 
elements under consideration.  Models define relationships between elements in a 
structured manner.  Understanding the current state of security requirements 
approaches can be useful in determining barriers and drawbacks.  Based on this 
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survey of approaches, the following sections will outline the evolution of current 
security requirements approaches.  Pros and cons to current approaches will be 
addressed in order to determine the key elements required to develop a new security 
requirements elicitation approach.  
 Best Practices and Enumerations 2.1
Software security engineering has evolved from best practices such as enforcing 
coding standards to mitigating risk at the organizational level (Giorgini, Massacci, 
Mylopoulos, & Zannone, 2005). Best practices are often associated with the design 
and implementation phases rather than during the requirements specification phase 
(Falcarin & Morisio, 2004; McGraw, 2008).  Best practices should enhance 
requirements elicitation and analysis during requirements specification instead of 
focusing purely on design and development phases.  SSDL Touchpoints and OWASP 
cheat sheets are best practices approaches that were examined to determine relevancy 
to the requirements specification and analysis phases of development. 
2.1.1 SSDL TouchPoints 
Secure Software Development Lifecycle (SSDL) Touchpoints are part of the 
Software Security Framework (McGraw, Migues, & West, 2012).  SSDL 
Touchpoints consist of architectural analysis, code review and security testing 
practices which should be included in any software security framework.  
Architectural analysis occurs early in the development lifecycle but is performed after 
requirements have been specified.  Code review and security testing occur even later 
in the lifecycle.  Each of these practices focuses on later stages of development rather 
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than on earlier requirements elicitation and development phases. Abuse cases and 
attack patterns are recommended practices to be used during the requirements phase, 
but specific details are not given as part of the framework (McGraw, 2005).  
Touchpoints provide an overview of practices that should be followed but do not 
define specific tasks or processes for accomplishing these practices.  Therefore, 
SSDL Touchpoints broadly address all areas of development rather than specifically 
focusing on requirements elicitation.  
2.1.2 OWASP Cheat Sheets and Enterprise Security API 
“Cheat sheets”
1
, such as those available at The Open Web Application Security 
Project (OWASP), are intended to aid software engineers with solutions to specific 
security problems and as overall guidance for application security.  Compiled by an 
open source community of security experts, OWASP cheat sheets tend to target 
specific development activities and provide tips in the form of “what-to-do” and 
“what-not-to-do”.  The majority of the cheat sheets give guidance on development 
specific topics rather than requirements development. For example, the authentication 
cheat sheet provides general guidelines related to passwords including length, 
complexity, secure recovery mechanisms and authentication error messages. General 
examples of security vulnerabilities related to authentication are given, but attacker 
scenarios, such as abuse cases, are not covered in detail. Many of the cheat sheets 
target later stages of software development rather than the requirements elicitation 
phase.   
                                                 
1
 https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Cheat_Sheets 
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Cheat sheets are dynamic documents and can be categorized as either 
established or draft versions. Established cheats sheets primarily address code 
development activities, but draft cheat sheets are being developed that take a broader 
approach.  Secure SDLC and threat modeling are topics under development that may 
prove more useful for requirements development activities rather than later stages 
such as design and testing.  As a requirements elicitation tool, cheat sheets provide an 
opportunity to open the discussion with stakeholders on application security related 
topics. 
The Enterprise Security API (ESAPI)
2
 is a security control library for web 
application development. The ESAPI is downloadable for several development 
languages, but the extent of each library varies significantly.  As a supporting 
development tool, the ESAPI is best used to implement security requirements, but not 
as a requirements elicitation or development tool.  
There are disadvantages to using OWASP “cheat sheets” as a security 
requirements approach.  As the name implies, the OWASP community focuses on 
web applications.  Security principles that apply to web applications are transferrable 
to other types of applications, but as a general approach to developing software, 
OWASP may be limited in scope for some software development projects.  OWASP 
is also developed and maintained by an open source community with loose affiliation 
to software development organizations.  Ongoing support and resources are limited to 
the enthusiasm of the community and project priorities vary.  Finally, OWASP tends 
                                                 
2
 https://www.owasp.org/index.php/ESAPI 
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to focus on later stages of the SDLC rather than the early requirements phase.  These 
factors may limit the OWASP resources as a viable security requirements approach 
beyond increasing security awareness during requirements elicitation activities. 
2.1.3 Enumerations and Classifications 
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security office of Cybersecurity and 
Communications co-sponsors enumeration and classifications sites for cybersecurity 
related topics.  Sites are publically available and are sponsored by the MITRE 
Corporation.  A community of individuals and organizations maintains and develops 
each site based on their respective interest in the site. Three sites are commonly cited 
in the field of software security: 
 Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE)3 
 Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE)4 
 Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC)5 
The CWE provides a description of more than 700 software weaknesses each with 
applicable platform, common consequences and examples.  The CVE site provides a 
database of vulnerabilities and exposures identified by participating organizations.  
CVE identifiers are numbered and include brief information about the vulnerability 
and exposure.  Vulnerability scanners and reporting tools can use the CVE identifier 
to provide feedback to the developer for further analysis.  Both the CWE and CVE 
provide technical information that requires knowledge of software systems and is 
unlikely to be understood by the average user.  Specific topics can be searched in 
                                                 
3 http://cwe.mitre.org/ 
4 http://cve.mitre.org/ 
5 http://capec.mitre.org/ 
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either database, but a basic level of security knowledge is required as a starting point.  
For example, a specific weakness or vulnerability would have to be known first in 
order to search either database.  The amount of detail provided varies and specific 
information that could be used for risk analysis is not included.  Details provided are 
also generally focused on later stages of development, such as design, testing and 
maintenance.   
The CAPEC provides attack pattern information in a format similar to CVE 
and CWE and lists over 400 attack patterns.  CAPEC identifiers include a general 
description, attack prerequisites, likelihood of exploit, methods of attack and 
examples.  A scope of attack motivation and consequences (i.e., loss of 
confidentiality, lack of authorization) is given which could be used to understand 
general security principles, but this small detail is lost with respect to the other detail 
presented for each attack pattern.  Like the CVE and CWE, the information is 
presented in a very technical nature and does not include easily interpreted diagrams.  
Therefore, enumerations and classifications are of limited use as tools for 
requirements elicitation.  Additional discussion of the use of attack patterns beyond 
the CAPEC classification is included in subsequent sections. 
 Frameworks 2.2
Frameworks are a general structure in which the user can choose to define the actual 
approaches used to solve a problem. Secure TROPOS, the Software Security 
Framework, the Building Security In Maturity Model, and Integrating Requirements 
and Information Security were surveyed. 
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2.2.1 Secure TROPOS 
Secure Tropos extends the Tropos methodology to develop a “formal framework for 
modeling and analyzing security and trust requirements” (Giorgini, Massacci, 
Mylopoulos, & Zannone, 2004). Tropos takes into account not only computer 
systems, but the organizational environment in which the system interacts.  This 
includes the perspective of the users and stakeholders (actors) as well as their 
interactions, goals, shared resources and dependencies.  Secure Tropos incorporates 
security requirements engineering by modeling and analyzing trust and delegation 
relationships among agents or services. The trust model has similarities with abuser 
stories which are common in agile development. 
A drawback to using Secure Tropos is the assumption that requirements been 
elicited and identified in order to be modeled and analyzed.  Dependency and trust 
models need to be created.  If these models are complex, the requirements engineer 
would need to spend significant time and resources developing the model along with 
taking time to explain and clarify the model to business stakeholders.  The model also 
does not include risk information that could be used for prioritization of goals.  Other 
tools, such as abuser stories, may be easier to use and implement during the 
requirements elicitation phase for a project with limited resources. 
2.2.2 The Software Security Framework 
The Software Security Framework (SSF) addresses overall security, not just the 
development of software security requirements (McGraw, Migues, & West, 2012). 
SSF is organized into four domains:  Governance, Intelligence, SSDL Touchpoints, 
and Deployment.  Each domain has three practices with individual activities (111 
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total activities for all domains). The domains cover overall organizational security 
activities, but the intelligence domain addresses software security activities.  
Intelligence domain practices include attack models, security features and design, and 
standards and requirements.  Key elements from the intelligence domain can be 
useful when eliciting security requirements.  In particular, attack models can aid 
software engineers in eliciting security requirements by encouraging them to think 
like an attacker.  Although SSF defines specific practices to address security 
requirements engineering, the large number of activities and abstract nature of the 
framework do not make SSF suitable as a requirements elicitation solution 
2.2.3 Building Security In Maturity Model 
The Building Security In Maturity Model (BSIMM)
6
 was developed from security 
initiative data gathered from fifty-one organizations (McGraw, Migues, & West, 
2012).  The McGraw study began in 2008 and has evolved over the years to the 
current fourth iteration. McGraw maintains that developing only security processes is 
insufficient and a broader security initiative is required. The current iteration, 
BSIMM4, incorporates four domains with 12 practices for a total of 111 activities.  
An organization can assess their efforts for these activities to create an overall 
security score. Scoring allows an organization to compare internal efforts with peer 
organizations. 
Although the name implies that BSIMM is a specific model that can be 
followed, it is actually part of the SSF.  This allows organizations to choose specific 
                                                 
6
 http://www.bsimm.com 
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models or activities they wish to follow when undertaking a security initiative.  
BSIMM is intended to be used by organizations to benchmark current security 
activities against organizations participating in the yearly study.  Based on assessment 
from the domains, an organization can choose any model they deem appropriate to 
address deficiencies.  McGraw describes BSIMM as a “descriptive model” rather than 
providing “prescriptive guidance” (McGraw, Migues, & West, 2012). 
An advantage of BSIMM is that it provides an organization with broad 
security perspectives to build an initiative.  Deficiencies in any practice area or 
domain can be prioritized to improve the security maturity level for the organization. 
The disadvantage is that the organization must still choose an approach to addressing 
deficiencies.  BSIMM gives overall guidance in improving security initiatives for an 
organization of which software development activities are included in the intelligence 
domain.  Attack models are the key activity in the intelligence domain and can be 
used to supplement requirements elicitation activities.  Other activities include 
standards and requirements, but general guidance is given without a specific 
framework to follow to complete these activities.  Therefore, BSIMM does not 
provide enough detail to be used primarily for security requirements elicitation and 
development.   
 Methodologies 2.3
2.3.1 SQUARE 
The SQUARE model was initially developed as the System Quality Requirements 
Engineering model by researchers at Carnegie Mellon and the Software Engineering 
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Institute (Mead & Stehney, 2005).  The elicitation and prioritization phases of 
software development are the focus of the methodology. Nine steps are defined (see 
Table 2.1) which produce an output based on recommended input information. Each 
step has defined example techniques to accomplish each step as well as likely 
stakeholder participants.  A CASE tool has been developed by Carnegie Mellon 
researchers to implement the methodology (CERT-SEI, 2010).  
A possible drawback to the SQUARE model is in step three (develop 
artifacts). Researchers suggest that these artifacts may be related to the design phase 
rather than the requirements phase (Tondel, Jaatun, & Meland, 2008).  The 
methodology is quite complex and lengthy. Requirements specification may take 
months and requires considerable resources to use the methodology.  For small 
software development projects, it is likely that entire projects would be completed 
during this time frame.  Therefore, a more flexible, efficient approach requiring fewer 
resources is desired. 
  
 
23 
 
 
Table 2.1: SQUARE Methodology Steps (Mead et al., 2005) 
Step Description 
1 Agree on definitions  
2 Identify security goals  
3 Develop artifacts to support security requirements definition  
4 Perform risk assessment  
5 Select elicitation techniques  
6 Elicit security requirements  
7 Categorize requirements as to level (system, software, etc.) and whether they 
are requirements or other kinds of constraints  
8 Prioritize requirements  
9 Requirements inspection  
 
2.3.2 CLASP 
Secure Software’s CLASP (Comprehensive, Lightweight Application Security 
Process) was developed in 2005 to address all processes for software security 
development from requirements through testing and deployment (Viega, 2005). The 
Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) website
7
 states that CLASP 
“contains formalized best practices” related to all aspects of software development. 
CLASP is intended to be applicable to existing software or new development projects 
using high-level perspectives or views.  CLASP views include concepts, roles, 
                                                 
7
 CLASP downloads available at: 
http://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_CLASP_Project#Downloads  
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activity assessment, activity implementation and vulnerability. Views tend to cascade 
down starting with the concepts view, but views that may be revisited and cycled 
back through in a continuous improvement manner. The iterative nature CLASP 
departs from traditional development and favors agile development.   
CLASP is not a one-size fits all solution for improving application security.  
The 24 CLASP activities are not mandatory, but can be addressed at the discretion of 
the implementing organization.  Metrics for choosing and prioritizing activities are 
not specified, this is left up to the organization to choose.  In addition, many of the 
activities are recommended to be carried out with the use automated tools, but 
specific tools are not defined. Details of the problem types for the vulnerability view 
are provided in a static checklist which can aid in the implementation of CLASP, but 
is not in the form of an easy to use tool.  CLASP is therefore a generic roadmap 
which can be used for all software development activities, not a step-by-step 
checklist. 
2.3.3 OCTAVE 
Operationally Critical Threat, Asset and Vulnerability Evaluation (OCTAVE)
8
 is a 
risk assessment methodology developed by the Software Engineering Institute at 
Carnegie Mellon. Several tools are available for implementing OCTAVE and three 
OCTAVE methods are available.  Smaller organizations can use the OCTAVE-S 
method for a less intensive approach requiring fewer resources.  OCTAVE is not a 
security requirements development approach.  It is part of a larger initiative that an 
                                                 
8
 http://www.cert.org/octave/octaves.html 
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organization can undertake to assess organizational risk.  The results of the risk 
assessment can be used by an organization to understand broader security initiatives 
or to improve security awareness.  If an organization has undertaken risk assessment, 
the results may be useful in directing the development of security requirements.  
OCTAVE is not a lightweight approach that would be useful to undertake during 
requirements development for small, agile organizations. 
2.3.4 USeR Method 
Usage-centric Security Requirements engineering (USeR) method integrates quality 
tools into requirements engineering to extract security requirements from software 
requirements (Hallberg & Hallberg, 2006).  Voice of the customer (VoC) is a quality 
term often associated with quality function deployment and Six Sigma that helps to 
define the quality viewpoint of the customer (Gitlow & Levine, 2005).  USeR 
implements a voice of the customer table (VCT) by selecting requirements that 
appear related to security and generating security statements.  Each statement is 
analyzed by asking who, what, when, where, why and how to further understand each 
security statement.  Security needs and the resulting security requirements are further 
processed using affinity and hierarchy diagrams.  Two additional processes are 
performed to analyze security techniques and design implications. 
The USeR method is an approach to extract security requirements when users 
have a hard time explicitly defining security.  Stakeholders take an active role in the 
VCT analysis but must be guided by a skilled facilitator to fully extract security 
needs.  Details of techniques to construct affinity and hierarchy diagrams are lacking 
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and security expert knowledge is assumed to prioritize the diagrams.  The researchers 
note that tools such as misuse cases may be needed to improve requirements 
visualization.  However, the concept of extracting security requirements from general 
requirements and using quality techniques intriguing and aligns with the goals of this 
thesis.  Different techniques may be implemented to improve the USeR method as an 
improved security requirements approach. 
2.3.5 SURE/ASSURE 
Secure and Usable Requirements Engineering (SURE) and Automated Support for 
Secure and Usable Requirements Engineering (ASSURE) propose to provide support 
throughout out all stages of the software development lifecycle (Romero-Mariona, 
2009). SURE builds on previous approaches to improve the development of security 
requirements and increase the usability in subsequent development activities.  There 
are two main steps for the SURE process:  security requirements and security testing:  
The security requirements process combines existing approaches by implementing 
CLASP activities and the USeR method.  Security statements evolve to security needs 
and then finally, security requirements are created (Hallberg & Hallberg, 2006).  
Security testing focuses on later stages of software development by deriving three sets 
of test cases.  Misuse cases and threat consequences are modeled as inputs for the test 
cases.   
The process of developing security requirements is an extension of the USeR 
method that also specifies misuse cases (see section 2.4.4 for further discussion of 
misuse cases).  Furthermore, the primary focus of SURE is to support all stages of 
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software development rather than just focusing on requirements specification.  As 
discussed in previous sections, the USeR method is an intriguing approach to 
extracting security requirements.  The proposed requirements elicitation approach 
expands on the general concepts of the USeR and SURE methodologies to improve 
security requirements elicitation in an iterative nature. 
 Elicitation Techniques and Models 2.4
Elicitation techniques and models are often used in conjunction with each other 
during the development process.  Commonly, elicitation techniques are activities that 
assist stakeholders with defining security requirements.  The artifacts developed from 
these techniques are then incorporated into the model for further analysis.  Models are 
used for different purposes during software development.  Some models use software 
requirements as input in order to design the system architecture.  Other models are 
used to during elicitation activities to develop requirements.  Elicitation techniques 
and models to address security in software projects come in varying forms. Some are 
geared toward security experts; others do not assume expert knowledge.  The 
following sections discuss common elicitation techniques and models that are geared 
towards software security. 
2.4.1 UMLsec and SecureUML 
UMLsec extends the Unified Modeling Language (UML) to specifically model 
security features (Jürgens, 2002).  Security profiles are generated consisting of a 
concept called stereotypes that include tagged values and constraints.  A goal of 
UMLsec is to aid software engineers who do not have strong security backgrounds to 
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use UMLsec to model security requirements (Jürgens, 2001).  Automated tools can be 
used to implement security checking based on UMLsec (Falcarin & Morisio, 2004).  
Like UMLsec, SecureUML is a security modeling language which also extends UML 
to include specific security constraints related to access controls and is based on role-
based access control (RBAC) security model (Lodderstedt, Basin, & Doser, 2002). 
The main drawback to SecureUML is that the primary focus is to aid in design 
activities rather than requirements specifications.   
A drawback to both UMLsec and SecureUML is the assumption that software 
engineers have a background with UML and will be able to quickly incorporate 
security modeling into UML diagrams.  The formal nature of UML diagramming 
works best in traditional development but could be a drawback for agile development 
teams.  To address audiences beyond UML users, CARiSMA
9
 is a newer security 
modeling tool that is integrated into the popular Eclipse IDE.  CARiSMA was built to 
succeed UMLsec, but it appears that this takes the emphasis even further from 
requirements specification and deeper into the design phase. In addition, UMLsec has 
a strong focus on critical systems development which may limit usefulness as a 
general security modeling tool.   
2.4.2 SDL and STRIDE 
The Microsoft Security Development Lifecycle (SDL)
10
 is a group of security 
practices that can be integrated into the software development lifecycle.  Practices are 
grouped into training, requirements, design, implementation, verification, release and 
                                                 
9 http://vm4a003.itmc.tu-dortmund.de/carisma/web/doku.php 
10 http://www.microsoft.com/security/sdl/default.aspx 
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response phases. Tools are available for most phases, but are very broadly defined.  
For example, there are three practices for the requirements phase.  The security 
requirements practice generally states that security and privacy requirements should 
be defined early.  However, no practical mention is made of how to go about defining 
security requirements.  The SDL provides useful guidance for an overall security 
development initiative, but is lacking in detail.  Downloadable tools, where available, 
also make the assumption that development takes place using Microsoft Visual 
Studio.   
Threat modeling is treated as a design phase practice.  STRIDE is a threat 
modeling approach developed by Microsoft to be incorporated during design.  
STRIDE stands for Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information disclosure, 
Denial of service, and Elevation of privilege. Each of these threats is tied to a specific 
security property (i.e., confidentiality, integrity, availability, etc.).  Unlike other 
models which focus on assets or attackers, SDL focuses on overall software 
development using a tool based approach designed for ease of use by software 
engineers. The SDL threat modeling process is illustrated as a cyclical process with 
activities of diagram, identify threats, mitigate, and validate making it similar to other 
continuous improvement processes. Compliance with Microsoft SDL process 
includes but is not limited to 16 mandatory security activities.  A drawback of 
STRIDE is that language and concepts covered tend to target software engineers 
rather than a larger group of stakeholders that includes non-technical users.  In fact, 
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the STRIDE overview emphasizes use during the design phase with software 
engineers and architects as the primary audience. 
2.4.3 Extended Activity-Based Quality Model 
The concept of security is similar to quality in that while difficult to define, once 
agreed upon, security concepts can be reused.  Subsequent reuse of requirements will 
lead to a reduction of project cost.  This concept is the emphasis behind the Extended 
Activity-Based Quality Model (eABQM) which is implements reuse of security 
requirements (Luckey, Baumann, Méndez, & Wagner, 2010). Security requirements 
are modeled as facts and activities both of which are dependent on impact. The 
researchers theorize that incorporating project goals, parameters and relevance factors 
into the model will support requirements reusability. The ability to model security 
requirements and the reusability of results were the primary goals of implementing 
eABQM. 
This approach does not support the initial generation of security requirements, 
but does show promise that the development of a security requirements repository can 
reduce project cost.  While not discussed, a requirements repository could aid 
software engineers in improving security awareness and training leading to overall 
improvements in developing secure software.   The concept of project parameters and 
categories could be modified to be security terminology and categories for an 
improved approach.  
2.4.4 Misuse Cases, Security Use Cases and Abuse Cases 
Misuse cases are a negative form of use cases used to elicit non-functional security 
requirements  and analyze security threats (Alexander, 2003; Firesmith, 2003). 
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Misuse cases are generated to clearly highlight how a misuser can violate application 
security (Firesmith, 2003).  In this context, a misuser is generally defined as an 
insider or an outsider with malicious intent.  Firesmith refines the use case concept to 
analyze and specify security requirements through the development of security use 
cases.  Software engineers create misuse cases which drive the development of 
security use cases to be used to develop security requirements.  Reusability of 
security use cases is more feasible if they are as generically defined as possible with 
details abstracted out (Firesmith, 2003). Architectural and design decisions should not 
be made when developing security use cases. Security requirements should also avoid 
specifying security mechanisms.  Abuse cases (also referred to as threat scenarios) 
should be written in the stakeholder’s language to ensure understanding (Boström, 
Wäyrynen, Bodén, Beznosov, & Kruchten, 2006). Abuse cases are created in a form 
in which the interactions of actors results in a security violation.  In this context, 
abuse cases differ from misuse cases in that interactions that should not be allowed 
are modeled in abuse cases (Giorgini et al., 2004). 
2.4.5 Abuser Stories 
User stories are commonly used in agile processes to capture the user’s requirements 
for the product under development and are preferably written by users. This presents 
a quandary when developing security requirements. The agile development team most 
likely does not have an abuser (i.e., hacker, attacker) on the team nor are they 
considering what the system should not do (attacks).  Abuser stories are intended to 
take into account the attacker perspective in order to develop security requirements 
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for the proposed system (Peeters, 2005). User experiences can be useful in 
determining past security mishaps that may not be readily apparent to the 
development team.  Because user input is critical to creating user stories, this 
reinforces the need for ongoing security awareness and training for all stakeholders in 
order to anticipate security concerns and develop security requirements. 
Similar to user stories, abuser stories are ranked and scored by business value 
but also include perceived threats posed to assets (Peeters, 2005).  Prioritization of 
security goals plays a key role in developing security requirements for the approach 
proposed in this thesis.  Data used for ranking abuser stories can be used as input for 
the prioritization and validation activities. As an agile elicitation technique, user 
stories are easy to implement and do not require significant training.  The concept of 
generating a prioritized set of security goals is an intriguing concept that will be 
useful for the proposed approach.  Providing a method to prioritize security goals and 
iteratively creating security requirements could be an improvement to the concept of 
abuser stories. 
2.4.6 Attack Trees 
Decision trees are commonly used to graphically demonstrate the route and processes 
required to reach a decision.  Modeling the decisions that attackers make on a system 
has evolved into the concept of attack trees.  These trees are used to graphically 
analyze attack scenarios and incorporate cost or probability statistics so that the 
threats can be prioritized.  The root of the tree represents the attacker’s goal and the 
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leaves represent possible avenues to achieve the goal.  Highly detailed trees can be 
created, but the detail may be limited to the existing knowledge of the tree developer.  
Attack trees can go beyond relying on developer intuition about attack vectors 
to formalize risk analysis from the viewpoint of the attacker. (Ingoldsby, 2009) 
Attack scenarios are created and resources needed (e.g., attacker’s cost and ability) 
are used to establish scenario costs.  The difficulty that software engineers may have 
in determining cost is that they must be experts in the area to determine resource 
requirements and they must put on their “black hats”.  When creating initial attack 
trees, some attack scenarios may have an unlikely probability of being carried out and 
are “pruned” or removed from the tree.  Attackers make cost-benefit decisions just as 
software engineers make the same decisions when prioritizing security requirements.  
SecurITree
11
 is a commercially available attack tree tool that can be used to facilitate 
attack tree modeling.  
Attack trees are another model that can be used for risk and cost-benefit 
analysis, but software engineers still need to have a considerable arsenal of 
information available to begin constructing attack trees.  The model provides a more 
structured approach than using best practices and checklists, but still requires 
education as well as the ability to apply statistical information.  Small, agile 
organizations simply may not have the resources to implement attack tree analysis as 
it requires security experts for statistical and cost analysis.   
                                                 
11
 http://www.amenaza.com/ 
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2.4.7 Attack Patterns and Security Patterns 
Patterns are developed through the application of knowledge or experience in order to 
be reused over and over again. Over time, adjustments are made to an existing pattern 
to improve the pattern or to develop a new pattern. “Attack patterns describe the 
techniques that attackers may use to break software” (Barnum & Sethi, 2006). The 
concept of patterns for software development originated with design patterns for 
reusability. Attack and security patterns expand on this concept by attempting to build 
catalogs of patterns to close the gap between attackers and software engineers. 
Cataloged information includes pattern name/classification, attack prerequisites, 
related vulnerabilities/weaknesses, attack methods (vectors), knowledge required, and 
recommended solutions. Security patterns were proposed to “bridge the gap” between 
security professionals and systems developers. The Common Attack Pattern 
Enumeration and Classification
12
 (CAPEC) was developed by and are supported for 
the larger software development community to aid in secure software development. 
 Comparison of Approaches 2.5
Integrating security requirements into the software development process can be 
difficult.  Development teams who have not previously considered security 
requirements will not only need to integrate new processes into existing development 
but also to understand an entirely new set of problems.  Understanding security 
terminology, existing and emerging vulnerabilities, analyzing security risk and 
prioritizing security requirements into ongoing processes may be difficult.  Software 
                                                 
12
 http://capec.mitre.org 
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engineers will seek manageable, efficient approaches to ease this transition.  This 
survey highlights some of the proposed approaches to address specific issues for 
security requirements development.   
An organization undertaking a security initiative may be overwhelmed when 
trying to determine where to start.  The approach taken may depend on many factors 
including the size of the organization, security awareness, security culture, types of 
products developed, education levels of software engineers and software development 
processes followed.  A security event may have thrust the initiative into high-gear.  
Perhaps there was a general security breach, a pending proposal for a new product 
requiring security features or pending legislation.  Regardless, the organization 
determines that security requirements are to receive attention.  The prioritization of 
integration may require quick action or as part of an ongoing effort.  All of these 
factors should be considered as improvements to security requirements integration 
approaches. 
None of the existing approaches focuses on the financial or risk aspects based 
on new legislation.  It is difficult to keep up with pending and new legislation as well 
as to understand due diligence required to meet regulations.  The impact of regulation 
should be part of the early requirements elicitation process.  This will help users and 
software engineers understand general security vulnerabilities that may not have been 
given prior consideration as well as to place financial impact on determining which 
requirements to include.  It is not feasible to include all features that a user desires 
whether it is a general feature or security specific feature.  Including risk cost analysis 
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if a security requirement is not implemented will clarify security issues for all 
stakeholders. 
Software engineers are likely to have requirements documents processes in 
place.  The prototype approach should include an automated scanning tool, much like 
automated code review tools, to identify areas to include security requirements.  For 
example, requirements may already be included that are not specifically identified as 
security requirements, but that include security components.  Scanning for security 
related terminology and identifying these requirements could jump start security 
integration process.  Stakeholders will have a starting point for beginning to increase 
security awareness rather than facing a multi-step approach that may not yield results 
as quickly as desired. 
Finally, the surveyed approaches are either broad based or focus on specific 
phases of the SDLC (see Table 2.2).  Focusing on only one aspect of development 
process, especially later stages, can lead to omitting important elements.  Security 
requirements could then become less important if they are seen as part of the process 
that someone else will take care of during later phases of development.  The same 
principle occurs with quality.  If quality is seen as something to be checked at the end 
of the process, the natural instinct is to pass the problem down the line.  However, 
when quality becomes the concern of the entire process, then quality is prioritized and 
is built into the entire process. The same concept should be applied to the integration 
of security requirements into the entire process. 
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Table 2.2: Comparison of Security Requirements Approaches 
Approach R D I V M 
Best Practices and Enumerations 
SSDL Touchpoints           
OWASP Cheat Sheets           
CWE, CVE, CAPEC           
Frameworks 
Secure Tropos           
SSF           
BSIMM           
IRIS           
Methodologies 
SQUARE           
CLASP           
OCTAVE            
USeR            
SURE/ASSURE           
Elicitation Techniques and Models 
UMLsec and SecureUML            
SDL            
STRIDE            
eABQM            
Misuse, security use. abuse cases           
Abuse stories           
Attack trees           
Attack patterns           
Security patterns           
      Software Development Design Phases 
     R = Requirements 
 
Strong association   
D = Design 
 
Weak association   
I = Implementation 
     V = Verification 
     M = Maintenance 
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3 Security Requirements 
Elicitation 
Research has shown that integrating security requirements into the early phases of the 
software development life cycle has significant benefits (Mead et al., 2005; Moffett, 
Haley, & Nuseibeh, 2004).  Security requirements should be elicited and developed 
along with functional requirements and should be included as part of the software 
requirements specification. Best practices, enumerations, frameworks, methodologies, 
elicitation techniques and models have been proposed that are intended to improve 
the integration of security requirements into early phases of development.  SSDL 
Touchpoints, SSF, BSIMM, and OWASP take a very broad view emphasizing 
building security initiatives at all stages of software development.  SQUARE, CLASP 
and Secure Tropos address integration of security requirements but are geared 
towards long development lifecycles and could be cumbersome for agile 
organizations.  IRIS and SURE/ASSURE seek to improve usability of security 
requirements rather than eliciting security requirements.  OCTAVE and STRIDE are 
used for threat modeling.  CWE, CVE, CAPEC aid software engineers during design 
and coding phases to implement requirements rather than eliciting requirements.  
UMLsec, SecureUML and eABQM model security features and support reuse of 
requirements.  Finally, misuse cases, abuse stories, attack trees and other approaches 
are elicitation activities that can be undertaken as part of a larger security 
requirements elicitation initiative. 
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Each of these approaches may be useful when developing security 
requirements, but are too broad, too specific, lengthy, or require expert knowledge to 
be used with agile software development. Therefore, integrating security 
requirements into existing software development lifecycles in a manner that can be 
implemented by small, agile organizations is proposed.  The proposed elicitation 
approach analyzes, prioritizes and develops preliminary security requirements from 
general software requirements artifacts using POS tagging.  USeR and 
SURE/ASSURE approaches both cite the difficulty with extracting security 
requirements from users due to a general lack of security knowledge (Hallberg & 
Hallberg, 2006; Romero-Mariona, 2009). Integrating POS tagging to capture security 
requirements implied by business stakeholders but not specifically stated is expected 
to improve security requirements elicitation.  The output preliminary security 
requirements captured from POS tagging can then be modeled, defined, and validated 
(not covered by this thesis) to generate final security requirements in later stages of 
the software development cycle.  Figure 1.2 gives a broad overview of how the 
proposed approach integrates into the software development lifecycle.  
The proposed requirements elicitation approach will be iterative which will 
distinguish it from other approaches such as SQUARE (Mead & Stehney, 2005).  
SQUARE also assumes that a team is designated for the specific purpose of eliciting 
security requirements.  Small organizations simply may not have the personnel 
resources to allocate an entire team to this task and will need to incorporate these 
activities into the regular requirements elicitation activities.  POS tagging activities 
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and the implementation of a security requirements repository are also innovative in 
that they are not currently implemented by the surveyed approaches. The following 
sections describe the POS tagging approach, security requirements repository, and the 
identify, categorize, understand and prioritize activities for the security requirements 
elicitation approach. 
 Security Requirements Repository Design 3.1
The activities in the security requirements elicitation approach rely on the 
development of a security requirements repository. A prototype of the security 
requirements repository is shown in Figure 3.1.  The subsequent sections detail the 
entities and attributes for the repository.  (Primary keys are denoted as PK.) 
 
Figure 3.1:  Security Requirements Repository Model 
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3.1.1 Security Terminology Entity 
Attributes for the security terminology entity are TerminologyID (PK), 
Security Term, and Security Term Description.  Security Term 
attributes are single terms (unigrams) that will be used during POS tagging.  The 
repository will be populated with terms identified by the requirements engineer based 
on experience or by using a dictionary of security terms.  Over time, security terms 
can be refined to improve the effectiveness of POS tagging.  Each security term has 
additional details, such as definitions or phrases, which enhance the understanding of 
each security term. Table 3.1 is a set of security terms that are used to populate the 
repository prior to POS tagging.  These terms were chosen after a broad scan of 
sample software requirements specification documents for security related 
terminology. 
Table 3.1: Security Terms 
Security Terms 
  access certificates malicious 
audit deny password 
authenticate encrypt permission 
authentication encryption privileges 
authorize https risk 
authorized logon security 
certificate 
   
3.1.2 Security Principles Entity 
Attributes for the security principles entity are PrincipleID (PK), Principle, 
and Description.  As a minimum, security principles are confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability (CIA), but additional security principles can be defined as 
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well.  Description attributes are definitions or details to provide a common basis of 
understanding among stakeholders. Security principles and description for the 
repository are shown in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2: Security Principles and Description 
Principle Description 
Confidentiality unauthorized disclosure of information 
Integrity unauthorized modification or destruction of information 
Availability disruption of access to or use of information of an information system 
 
3.1.3 Terminology and Principles Entity 
Attributes for the terminology and principles entity are TermPrincipleID (PK) 
and secondary keys, TerminologyID, and PrincipleID.   
3.1.4 Requirements Artifacts Entity 
Attributes for the requirements artifacts entity are ArtifactID (PK), Artifact 
Name, Artifact Description, Artifact Type. 
3.1.5 Security Requirements Entity 
Attributes for the security requirements entity are SecReqID (PK), 
TermPrincipleID, SecReq Description, SecReq Comments, and 
ArtifactID.  Secondary keys are TermPrincipleID and ArtifactID.  
SecReq Description is the security requirement that is generated during the 
elicitation activity.  SecReq Comments are general comments regarding the 
security requirement. 
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3.1.6 Software Requirements Entity 
Attributes for the software requirements entity are SoftwareReqID (PK) and 
secondary key, SecReqID.  The entity relates the newly generated security 
requirements to the software requirements specification artifact. 
 
 Security Requirements Elicitation Activities 3.2
The activities in the security requirements elicitation approach are: 
 Identify candidate security goals 
 Categorize security goals based on security principle 
 Understand stakeholder goals and develop preliminary security requirements 
 Prioritize preliminary security requirements 
Each activity defines inputs, roles, techniques and output.  Inputs are 
requirements related artifacts.  Roles are the development team and business 
stakeholders responsible for the activity.  Techniques are applied to accomplish each 
activity and a security requirements artifact is output. The output for the approach is a 
prioritized security requirements artifact.  Figure 3.2 represents the input, roles, 
techniques and output for the approach activities. 
 
 
44 
 
 
Figure 3.2:  Security Requirements Approach Components 
 
3.2.1 Identify Candidate Security Goals 
Identifying security requirements can be difficult if stakeholders have difficulty 
expressing security related needs.  Business stakeholders may imply the need to 
protect assets based on the knowledge of vulnerabilities and threats.  However, 
business stakeholder knowledge about vulnerabilities and threats may not be 
extensive which leads to ambiguity expressing security needs.  The result may be 
functional requirements written with security terminology that implies security 
requirements but that are not explicitly defined.  If security terminology can be 
discovered, candidate security goals can be identified that with further analysis could 
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be used to develop security requirements.  Figure 3.3 shows the detail for the identify 
security goals activity. 
 
 
Figure 3.3:  Identify Candidate Security Goals Activity 
 
POS Tagging 
Online reviews provide seemingly unbiased opinions about products and services that 
can be used to inform consumers about purchasing decisions.  Many web sites have 
an area for users to post and share comments about products or services.  Ratings and 
opinion comments are the general form of an online review providing a quick 
snapshot of standing as well as testimonials.  As the popularity of online reviews 
increased, businesses realized the strategic advantages that online reviews present to 
influencing reputation and purchasing decisions of consumers.  A good review can 
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significantly boost sales whereas as poor review can have a detrimental impact on 
business.  Therefore, extracting or capturing sentiment from online reviews, or 
opinion mining, has been an active area of recent research (Dave, Lawrence, & 
Pennock, 2003; Harris, 2012; Hu & Liu, 2004a, 2004b; Jindal & Liu, 2008; Ku, 
Liang, & Chen, 2006).   
Aggregating and extracting meaning from online reviews requires 
understanding the nature of posted reviews.  Online reviews are created when a user 
posts opinions about products and services.  Reviews typically allow the user to 
choose from a rating, such as a scale of one to ten stars, as well as entering text 
reviews. User reviews are typically in commentary form where the reviewer can enter 
opinions in their own words about a product and are intended to enhance the 
usefulness of a rating and provide additional product insight. Aggregating ratings is 
not a statistically complicated task, but analyzing text reviews presents a challenge 
since quantitative analysis methods cannot be easily applied to extract meaning from 
natural language input.  To address this problem, opinions or sentiment must be 
categorized and extracted from text reviews.    
Much of the research in opinion mining is based on data mining and natural 
language processing techniques.  Techniques use a combination of training data, 
human classification and fully automated processes with varying accuracy and 
performance results.  POS tagging is one proposed method to extract opinions from 
reviews (Hu & Liu, 2004a; Ku et al., 2006)  and is commonly applied to identify 
features as noun phrases and  opinions as close proximity adjectives.  Genre 
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identification and text categorization is one approach used to automate review 
classification (Ott, Choi, Cardie, & Hancock, 2011).  Parsing tools, such as the 
Stanford Parser, are also available to automate POS tagging and determine word 
frequency. 
Although automated processes were used in many of the approaches, other 
work relied on human experts manually identifying words or phrases that indicate 
opinion sentiment (Harris, 2012).  For small data sets, manual review is feasible if 
automated approaches are not available.  Larger data sets, such as those requiring 
crawling millions of reviews, use automated approaches to create smaller data sets 
that are then reviewed manually.  Researchers frequently cite the difficulty building a 
dataset since it is arduous for human evaluators to manually cull through large 
numbers of reviews. Therefore, many approaches also include creating a repository of 
relevant terms that are refined over time.  Another goal is to create a “gold standard” 
dataset that can be used among researchers and refined over time to improve opinion 
mining results.   
The goals of online review opinion mining and extracting security 
requirements are similar.   Natural language input contains meaning or sentiment that 
may not be easily inferred.  Human experts and manual review methods are required 
to build a set of words or phrases that are meaningful based on the desired end result.  
Machine learning techniques are desired, but the use of experts can be effective and 
efficient until these techniques mature and are refined.   
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Word frequency analysis is commonly used in opinion mining but is not as 
useful when applied to security requirements extraction.  Opinion mining seeks to 
find similarities among disparate reviewers for a specific product or service.  Reviews 
are typically short in length, informal and are intended to convey a specific message.  
In contrast, software products are developed for a specific set of stakeholders and 
there is a single software requirements document that is formal and lengthy.  
Therefore, counting the frequency of a specific term within a set of reviews reveals 
different information than the term frequency of a single document.  However, if the 
frequency of security related terms is high in a software requirements artifact, term 
frequency could indicate then need to define security requirements.  
Proximity of terms may reveal relevant information within a software 
requirements document.  For example, if the terms “security” and “encryption” are 
located within close proximity of each other, then the terms may be associated with 
each other and could reveal an underlying security requirement.  Security terms 
should therefore be tagged and follow-up analysis performed to determine if security 
requirements can be captured.  This is the proposed method in which POS tagging 
will be implemented to discover security requirements.  Additional details on POS 
tagging are discussed in the identify activity of the security requirements elicitation 
approach.   
One method to identify security terminology implied in requirements is 
through the use of POS tagging.  The requirements engineer takes as input 
preliminary requirements documents.  These documents can be draft software 
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requirements specifications (SRS), requests for proposals (RFP’s), or other 
requirements specification documents that will be used to generate the final software 
requirements specification.  Artifacts are scanned for commonly used security 
terminology.  Generating commonly used security terms can be left up to the 
knowledge of the requirements engineer or a dictionary of security terminology can 
be used if available.  Discovered security terminology and the location within the 
requirements artifacts are tagged for additional review.  After all artifacts have been 
tagged, the requirements engineer reviews the requirements artifacts and identifies 
candidate security goals. 
Candidate security goals (CSG) are general requirements written with implied 
security needs that may be developed into security requirements.  For example, a 
requirements artifact was scanned and tagged for the word malicious.  The following 
functional requirements (FR) were found: 
FR–1: “Malicious requests are detected and rejected”  
FR–2:  “Malicious requests are identified and acted upon” 
The requirements engineer would tag the location(s) where the term malicious was 
found and generate a CSG such as: 
CSG-1: The system shall identify, detect and determine 
appropriate responses to malicious requests 
Further examination of the requirements artifacts also reveals that requests are related 
to access policies.  The CSG can be refined to include this information: 
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CSG-1:  The system shall identify, detect and determine 
appropriate responses to malicious requests using access 
control policies 
After all artifacts have been scanned, tagged and reviewed, a candidate security goals 
artifact will be created as output for the identify activity.  This artifact will be used as 
input to the categorize security goals activity.   
3.2.2 Categorize Security Goals Based on Security Principle 
Candidate security goals identified from the previous activity are used as input for the 
categorize activity.  The requirements engineer and business stakeholders work 
together to review all requirements artifacts that have tagged candidate security goals.  
Interactive meetings (face-to-face, web facilitated, teleconference) will likely be the 
most efficient, but virtual document review can also take place.  Prior to the meetings, 
the requirements engineer can assess the goals for quick categorization to facilitate 
efficient communications.  Business stakeholders should be educated on general 
security principles prior to the meeting.  During this activity, each security goal is 
categorized based on a security principle in order to facilitate additional stakeholder 
elicitation.  Confidentiality, integrity, and availability principles, also referred to as 
CIA, are the key security principles, but other principles can be defined as well.  Each 
candidate security goal should be categorized with at least one security principle.   
Referring to the example CSG from the identify activity; the following 
security principles can be associated with the CSG:  
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SP-1:  Confidentiality:  protect against unauthorized disclosure of 
information 
SP-2:  Integrity:  protect against unauthorized modification or 
destruction of information 
The requirements engineer and business stakeholders will agree upon the general 
security principles. If a candidate security goal cannot be categorized, additional 
elicitation and analysis can be iteratively undertaken with the stakeholders.  If CSG’s 
still cannot be categorized after additional iterations, it will fail the activity and the 
CSG will be discarded.  The details for the categorize security goals based on security 
principle activity are shown in Figure 3.4.   
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Figure 3.4:  Categorize Security Goals Activity 
3.2.3 Understand Stakeholder Goals and Develop Preliminary Security 
Requirements 
Using the refined security goals from the categorize activity, the requirements 
engineer and business stakeholders seek to further understand the implications of the 
security goals.  Additional artifacts such as policies and regulations are also used as 
input to this activity.  The requirements engineer chooses techniques and tools to 
further elicit information from the business stakeholders.  Face-to-face or virtual 
meetings are a good choice of techniques for generating discussion.  The choice of 
tools is likely to be influenced by the requirements engineer but could include 
generating misuse or abuse cases, attack trees, or other security related modeling.  
The output from this activity is a set of preliminary security requirements based on 
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the CSG’s.  Continuing with the previous example, the preliminary security 
requirement (PSR) generated from CSG-1 could be: 
PSR-1:  The system shall protect the confidentiality and integrity 
of data by identifying, detecting and rejecting malicious 
requests using access control policies 
The details for the understand stakeholder goals and develop preliminary security 
requirements activity are shown in Figure 3.5.  
 
Figure 3.5:  Understand Stakeholder Goals Activity 
 
3.2.4 Prioritize Preliminary Security Requirements 
Preliminary security requirements need to be prioritized to generate the final security 
requirements.  During this activity, the requirements engineer continues to work with 
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business stakeholders to analyze the input preliminary security requirements.  
Recommended analysis techniques are risk management tools commonly used by the 
stakeholders who will foster familiarity with the process.  An additional technique, 
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), is also recommended. 
FMEA is an analysis and decision making tool often associated with quality 
and Six Sigma methodologies.  A failure mode is the manner in which something 
might fail.  Effects analysis is the study of the consequences of these failures.  FMEA 
is used to identify, estimate, prioritize, and reduce the risk of failure.  As a software 
engineering tool, FMEA is not widely used, but has advantages over other analysis 
tools in that it is easy to implement and can be used by a broad audience.  A 
requirements engineer can use FMEA to elicit security related information from 
stakeholders, prioritize the data, and present an analysis of the risks associated.  The 
prioritized risks allow for informed decision making to choose which actions to 
consider.  This approach is very useful to communicate and clarify the impact of 
technical materials in an easy to understand format. 
Analysis requires creating severity, occurrence and detection rankings in order 
to determine a risk priority number (RPN).  A standard scale for severity, occurrence 
and detection can be adopted similar to Table 3.3 as a starting point for FMEA 
analysis.  Experienced FMEA users may develop more refined rankings similar to 
Table 3.4, Table 3.5, and Table 3.6.  The RPN is calculated as the product of the risk 
rankings.   
RPN = (severity ranking)(occurrence ranking)(detection ranking) 
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Continuing from the previous activities, Table 3.7 demonstrates analyzing the 
preliminary security requirement related to malicious requests (SR-1).  The security 
requirements engineer could generate a preliminary table and follow-up with business 
stakeholder or all stakeholders could be involved at the start of analysis.  Effects 
related to loss of confidentiality and integrity are determined to be viewed, stolen or 
corrupted data.  Rankings for severity, occurrence and detection are determined by 
the stakeholders and the RPN is calculated.  The resulting RPN generates a prioritized 
list of potential security requirements.  In this scenario, the risk of data being stolen 
by a malicious request significantly outweighs other effects.  Using the FMEA 
results, requirements engineer and business stakeholders will refine the preliminary 
security requirements until a list of final security requirements has been generated. 
The details for the prioritize security requirements activity are shown in Figure 3.6.  
 
Table 3.3: FMEA Standard Scale 
Standard Scale for Severity, Occurrence or Detection 
Impact Rating Criteria:  A Failure Could… 
Very 
High 9-10 virtually inevitable 
 High 8-7 failure likely, many known cases 
 Moderate 4-6 somewhat likely, some known cases 
 Low 3-2 few known cases 
Unlikely 1 no known cases 
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Table 3.4: FMEA Severity Scale 
Severity Scale = Likely Impact of Failure 
Impact Rating Criteria:  A Failure Could… 
Bad 10 Injure a customer or employee 
  9 Be illegal 
  8 Render the software unfit for use 
  7 Cause extreme customer dissatisfaction 
  6 Result in partial malfunction 
  5 Cause a loss of performance likely to result in a complaining 
  4 Cause minor performance loss 
  3 Cause a minor nuisance; can be overcome with no loss 
  2 Be unnoticed; minor effect on performance 
Good 1 Be unnoticed and not affect the performance 
 
 
Table 3.5: FMEA Occurrence Scale 
Occurrence Scale = Frequency of Failure 
Impact Rating Time period 
Probability of 
Occurrence 
Bad 10 More than once per day > 30% 
  9 Once every 3-4 days ≤ 30% 
  8 Once per week ≤ 5% 
  7 Once per month ≤ 1% 
  6 Once every 3 months ≤ 0.3 per 1,000 
  5 Once every 6 months ≤ 1 per 10,000 
  4 Once per year ≤ 6 per 100,000 
  3 Once every 1-3 years 
≤ 6 per million (approx. 
six sigma) 
  2 Once every 3-6 years ≤ 3 per 10 million 
Good 1 Once every 6-100 years ≤ 2 per billion 
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Table 3.6:  FMEA Detection Scale 
Detection Scale = Ability to Detect Failure 
Impact Rating Definition 
Bad 10 Defect caused by failure is not detectable 
  9 Occasional units are checked for defects 
  8 Units are systematically sampled and inspected 
  7 All units are manually inspected 
  6 Manual inspection with mistake proofing modifications 
  5 Process is monitored with control charts and manually inspected 
  4 
Control charts used with an immediate reaction to out-of-control 
condition 
  3 
Control charts used as above with 100% inspection surrounding 
out-of-control condition 
  2 
All units automatically inspected or control charts used to 
improve the process 
Good 1 
Defect is obvious and can be kept from the customer or control 
charts are used for process improvement to yield a no-inspection 
system with routing monitoring 
 
 
Table 3.7: FMEA Analysis of Security Requirements 
Failure Effect Severity Occurrence Detection RPN 
malicious request data viewed 3 7 9 189 
malicious request data stolen 9 4 9 324 
malicious request data corrupted 5 4 4 80 
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Figure 3.6:  Prioritize Preliminary Security Requirements 
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4 Research Results Evaluation 
and Validation 
The security requirements elicitation approach will be evaluated empirically by 
analyzing publically available software requirements specifications (SRS).  An 
internet search of pdf and Word documents was conducted using the search term 
“software requirements specification”.  Many student project SRS documents are 
available from .edu sites and these were filtered out from the search.  Template 
documents were also discarded.  A base set of 46 SRS documents were downloaded 
of which three contained sections specifically for security requirements.  The 
remaining 43 SRS documents were used analyzed using POS tagging.  After tagging 
analysis, a smaller subset of the tagged documents was selected and analyzed using 
the security requirements elicitation steps.  We present POS tagging, security 
requirements elicitation and results next. 
 POS Tagging 4.1
A set of security terminology was required in order to scan documents and conduct 
POS tagging.  The security terms chosen were based on manually reviewing SRS 
documents containing security requirements and the author’s knowledge.  The 
resulting set of security terms is show in Table 4.1.  Unigrams were chosen for 
scanning rather than n-grams (short security phrases).  Similar terms such as 
authenticate and authentication as well as plural forms of some terms were included 
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due to the requirements of the POS tagging software.  The set of security terms would 
be refined and updated after preliminary results are evaluated for future iterations of 
the approach.  Analysis of term frequency, false positives and term relevancy will be 
used to prune or expand the security term dataset.   
We developed a POS scanner to scan and tag the set of SRS documents.  
Small organizations are likely to generate SRS documents using word processing 
software rather than sophisticated software development management software.  All 
pdf documents were converted to Word 2010 format (.doc) in preparation for 
scanning.  The scanning software was written in Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) 
which integrates with Microsoft Word and can easily facilitate the scanning process.  
The basic steps in the scanning process are: 
1. Open the document 
2. Clear all bookmarks 
3. Scan for, count and bookmark the location of each security term 
4. Write the document name, security term and frequency to a text file 
5. Save and close the document 
Multiple files can be automatically scanned sequentially.  The entire scanning and 
tagging process is automated and processing time was approximately 1.5 minutes per 
document. 
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Table 4.1:  Security Terminology Frequency and Rank 
Security Terminology 
Security Term Frequency Rank 
access 416 2 
audit 28 10 
authenticate 5 17 
authentication 30 8 
authorize 0 19 
authorized 146 5 
certificate 205 4 
certificates 85 7 
deny 3 18 
encrypt 12 14 
encryption 20 12 
https 14 13 
logon 8 15 
malicious 8 15 
password 237 3 
permission 86 6 
privileges 24 11 
risk 30 8 
security 551 1 
Number of documents scanned: 43 
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Table 4.2:  SRS Document Security Term Frequency 
Security Term Frequency per SRS Document  
Doc # Frequency 
 
Doc # Frequency 
 
Doc # Frequency 
1 119 
 
16 20 
 
31 54 
2 24 
 
17 20 
 
32 52 
3 20 
 
18 41 
 
33 63 
4 14 
 
19 113 
 
34 56 
5 35 
 
20 27 
 
35 36 
6 22 
 
21 83 
 
36 52 
7 701 
 
22 141 
 
37 50 
8 17 
 
23 90 
 
38 64 
9 44 
 
24 31 
 
39 84 
10 29 
 
25 183 
 
40 73 
11 36 
 
26 26 
 
41 43 
12 21 
 
27 35 
 
42 47 
13 18 
 
28 87 
 
43 49 
14 14 
 
29 44 
 
    
15 27 
 
30 49 
 
    
Average Frequency of Security Terms per Document:  66.4 
Total Security Term Frequency: 2854 
Total SRS Documents Scanned:  43 
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4.1.1 Analysis of Tagged Security Terms 
Table 4.1 lists the security term frequency and relative ranking.  Five security terms 
with the highest frequency are security, access, password, certificate, and authorized.  
Security terms with the lowest frequency are authorize, deny, authenticate, logon and 
malicious.  Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2 graphically display the security term frequency 
and average frequency for each of the selected security terms.  Table 4.2 shows the 
per document tagging statistics.  The security term frequency per document revealed 
a total of 2,854 terms tagged with an average per document frequency of 66.4.  
Tagged term frequency ranged from a low of 14 to a high of 701. The average term 
frequency may be skewed by one document that has a very high term frequency.  
Without this document the average is closer to 51 but even at 66.4, it is low enough 
that manual review by a requirements engineer would not be cumbersome.  We will 
analyze the SRS documents to determine if the size of the security term dataset 
impacts the viability of discovering candidate security goals.  Results from the 
elicitation activities will be analyzed to determine if the set of security terms can be 
pruned to a smaller set or if additional security terms are needed to generate security 
requirements. 
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Figure 4.1:  Security Term Frequency from POS Tagging 
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Figure 4.2:  Security Term Average Frequency from POS Tagging 
 
 Security Requirements Elicitation 4.2
Eight tagged documents with the highest frequency were chosen for further analysis 
using the security requirements elicitation activities.  One of the documents was 
eliminated due to formatting issues.  The document with the highest security term 
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representative of the type of product that would be developed by a small organization 
and was also eliminated.   
4.2.1 Identify Candidate Security Goals 
Each document was manually reviewed to determine if the tagged security terms were 
relevant to identifying candidate security goals.  Custom code facilitated the process 
by selecting each tagged term and allowing the reviewer to accept or reject each term 
based on the context of the language surrounding each term.  Terms could be rejected 
(false positives) for a variety of reasons.  Acronym lists, glossaries and references to 
other documents were common reasons for rejecting or “un-tagging” a term.  Other 
terms were found to have a different meaning such as “certificate” paired with nouns 
that are not related to security such as “ship certificate”.  “Access” was another term 
that was frequently paired with “channel” in another document.  Other terms were 
repeated in close proximity, typically separated by a few words or in a nearby 
sentence.  When identical close proximity terms were found, only one of the terms 
remained tagged.  On the average, 15% of the tagged terms remained for an average 
of 27 terms per SRS document.  Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4 show the results of security 
term frequency before and after false positives are removed. 
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Figure 4.3:  Comparison of Original and Remaining Term Frequency 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4:  Average Security Term Frequency After Reduction 
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Carrying out the identify activity requires that the remaining security terms 
are analyzed to determine to identify candidate security goals (CSG).  Analysis from 
one of the SRS documents reveals the following CSG’s: 
CSG-1: The application will also allow for remote access through 
a firewall via outside telecommunications networks by 
authorized users. 
CSG-2: The logon screen shall request user name and 
corresponding password. 
CSG-3: For system login purposes, the hash function shall also be 
used to encrypt user passwords. 
 
4.2.2 Categorize Security Goals Based On Security Principle 
Each of the CSG’s is categorized based on security principle.  Security principles 
(SP) are commonly known as the CIA triad which stands for confidentiality, integrity 
and availability.  Common definitions for the security principles are: 
SP-1:  Confidentiality:  protect against unauthorized disclosure of 
information 
SP-2:  Integrity:  protect against unauthorized modification or 
destruction of information 
SP-3:  Availability:  protect against disruption of access to or use 
of information of an information system 
 
The CSG’s can be categorized with multiple security principles.  If no security 
principles can be applied, the CSG would be rejected. 
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CSG-1: SP-1, SP-2 
CSG-2: SP-2 
CSG-3: SP-2 
 
4.2.3 Understand Stakeholder Goals and Develop Preliminary Security 
Requirements 
Stakeholder goals are elicited for each of the categorized CSG’s and preliminary 
security requirements (PRS) are developed. 
PSR-1:  The system shall protect confidentiality and integrity of 
data by allowing remote access through a firewall ...only 
to authorized users. 
PSR-2:  The system shall protect integrity of data by requesting a 
user name and password prior to access. 
PSR-3:  The system shall protect confidentiality of user passwords 
by encrypting passwords. 
 
4.2.4 Prioritize Preliminary Security Requirements 
FMEA analysis is performed on for each PSR.  Potential failure modes and effects are 
identified.  The failure modes and effects are written in general terms for ease of 
understanding and quick analysis.  Severity, occurrence, and detection ratings were 
assigned using the standard FMEA scale shown in Table 3.3.  The FMEA analysis is 
shown in Table 4.3.  If the RPN is determined to be above a minimum threshold, the 
PSR will be accepted. Security requirements that are accepted will be included in the 
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SRS as security requirements and will be subject to additional modeling and 
validation activities included in later software development activities. The activities 
in the security requirements elicitation approach are documented using the template 
shown in Table 4.4.  All of the candidate security requirements were previously 
identified as general security requirements.  FMEA analysis confirms the need for 
security requirements.  The refined requirements can now be accepted as security 
requirements and can be input into the security requirements repository. 
Table 4.3:  FMEA Analysis of Preliminary Security Requirements 
Failure Effect Severity Occurrence Detection RPN 
remote access by 
unauthorized user 
data viewed 4 3 7 84 
remote access by 
unauthorized user 
data stolen 7 3 9 189 
remote access by 
unauthorized user 
data 
corrupted 
5 3 7 105 
access by unauthorized 
user 
data viewed 4 3 7 84 
password compromised data viewed 6 3 7 126 
password compromised data stolen 6 3 9 162 
password compromised 
data 
corrupted 
5 3 7 105 
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Table 4.4:  Security Requirements Elicitation Template 
Security Requirements Elicitation     
Document Name:       
Document ID: 19   Original tag count 113 
Project ID:     Final tag count 43 
1 Identify candidate security goals     
  Candidate Security Goals (CSG) 
 
  
  
CSG - 1 The application will also allow for remote access through a firewall via 
outside telecommunications networks by authorized users.  
  CSG - 2 The logon screen shall request user name and corresponding password.  
  
CSG - 3 For system login purposes, the hash function will also be used to encrypt 
user passwords. 
2 Categorize security goals based on security principle   
  Apply security principle(s) to CSG 
 
  
  CSG - 1 SP-1, SP-2 
  
  
  CSG - 2 SP-2 
  
  
  CSG - 3 SP-2 
  
  
3 Understand stakeholder goals and develop preliminary security requirements 
  Preliminary Security Requirement (PSR) 
 
  
  PRS - 1 
The system shall protect confidentiality and integrity of data by allowing 
remote access through a firewall ...only to authorized users. 
  PRS - 2 
The system shall protect integrity of data by requesting a user name and 
password prior to access. 
  PRS - 3 
The system shall protect confidentiality of user passwords by encrypting 
passwords. 
4 Prioritize preliminary security requirements   
  PSR Effect   FMEA RPN Accept/Reject 
  PRS - 1 Data Stolen 
 
189 Accept 
  PRS - 2 Data viewed 
 
84 Accept 
  PRS - 3 Password compromised 162 Accept 
  Prioritized Security Requirements (SR) 
 
  
  SR – 1 
The system shall protect confidentiality and integrity of data by allowing 
remote access through a firewall ...only to authorized users. 
  SR – 2 
The system shall protect integrity of data by requesting a user name and 
password prior to access. 
  SR – 3 
The system shall protect confidentiality of user passwords by encrypting 
passwords. 
Notes         
  All of the identified requirements should be reclassified as security requirements.   
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 Analysis of Security Requirements Elicitation Approach 4.3
The remaining documents were analyzed to determine if security requirements could 
be elicited using POS tagging and the security requirement elicitation approach.  
Table 4.5 is the analysis of the SRS documents with the highest term frequency.  
Security requirements specified indicates if a specific subsection of security 
requirements was included in the SRS.  If any of the identified security requirements 
were originally identified as functional or non-functional requirements and were 
subsequently determined to be security requirements, convert to security requirements 
is marked as “Yes”.  The number of identified security requirements from the analysis 
is also indicated.  Finally, general comments from the analysis are included.  
 
Table 4.5:  Security Requirements Analysis of SRS Documents 
Document #:     1 
Security Requirements Specified: No 
Convert to Security Requirements: Yes 
Identified Security Requirements: 9 
Contained use cases that discussed security concepts which could be converted to 
abuse or misuse cases.  Several functional requirements were in fact security 
requirements that should be re-written and classified as security requirements.  Non-
functional requirements were generally used to address security requirements 
(verifiability and security).  The verifiability section included requirements that 
addressed security concerns (terms used were suspicious records, authorized user, 
audits, special privileges).  All of these concerns should be converted to security 
requirements.  Security section described specific security mechanisms.  All of the 
identified security requirements had at least one tagged security term. 
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Document #:     19 
Security Requirements Specified: No 
Convert to Security Requirements: Yes 
Identified Security Requirements: 12 
Security requirements were scattered within other requirements (external system 
interfaces, communications interfaces, functional requirements).  One interesting 
note was found regarding system login (hash function shall be used to encrypt 
passwords, question in document asking why this was a requirement). 
 
Document #:     22 
Security Requirements Specified: No 
Convert to Security Requirements: Yes 
Identified Security Requirements: 6 
Very ambiguous and general requirements.  Authentication in the form of password 
requirements were the key security requirements.  Categorizing by security 
principles was effective since most of the tagged terms eluded to data integrity and 
confidentiality principles.  Most of the security requirements can be developed from 
existing functional and non-functional requirements.  
 
Document #:     23 
Security Requirements Specified: No 
Convert to Security Requirements: No 
Identified Security Requirements: 4 
Contained use cases to define the functional requirements.  Non-functional 
requirements contained a section on security that had a mash-up of policy and 
training information.  Definitions of strong passwords practices (length, special 
characters, numbers, password reuse) were included.  The basic specification was to 
require authentication using strong passwords or digital certificates.  There were 
only mild requirements that could be converted to stronger security requirements 
and many new security requirements could be added to account for data 
confidentiality and integrity. 
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Document #:     25 
Security Requirements Specified: No 
Convert to Security Requirements: Yes 
Identified Security Requirements: 8 
“Access” security term generally defined access controls.  Data confidentiality and 
integrity are also key considerations.  Comments were of a form such as: "There 
should be security preventing the intrusion into the system by unauthorized users, or 
users at unauthorized access levels." 
 
Document #:     28 
Security Requirements Specified: Yes 
Convert to Security Requirements: Yes 
Identified Security Requirements: 6 
There is a security requirements section, but it is only a paragraph that broadly 
identifies security characteristics.   Encryption, passwords, access controls (data 
integrity and confidentiality) are all specifically addressed.  Several security 
requirements were contained within functional requirements. 
 
Document #:     39 
Security Requirements Specified: No 
Convert to Security Requirements: Yes 
Identified Security Requirements: 4 
Security requirements were contained within functional requirements.  Permission 
levels, access controls, non-repudiation, encryption, and passwords were commonly 
used terms. Use cases were identified that could be modified into misuse or security 
use cases. 
 
Document #:     40 
Security Requirements Specified: No 
Convert to Security Requirements: Yes 
Identified Security Requirements: 6 
Contained use cases.  Security primarily for passwords and access with references to 
“secure connections”.  Contained references to legislation and regulations.   
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POS tagging revealed interesting data related to the relevancy of security 
terms when identifying security requirements.  Security terms with the highest 
frequency from initial scanning had a lower retention rate after manual review and 
pruning of security terms.  Terms such as “password” and “authentication” were 
heavily used and often repeated within close proximity.  Security requirements were 
frequently developed when a high concentration of security terms within a sentence 
or in neighboring sentences was found   Lower frequency terms were often not 
located in close proximity to other security terms but did identify security 
requirements.  These requirements were more subtly implied and would likely require 
additional elicitation and modeling with business stakeholders to fully understand the 
security goals.  Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.6 illustrate the analysis of security term 
frequency after an initial review of tagged security terms was conducted. 
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Figure 4.5:  Percentage of Security Terms Retained After Initial Review 
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Figure 4.6:  Comparison of Original and Pruned Security Term Frequency 
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 Feasibility of the Proposed Solution 4.4
Feasibility of the proposed solution should be taken into consideration given that we 
are targeting small, agile organizations.  Drawbacks to the approaches discussed in 
the survey chapter included approach complexity, resources and security expertise.  
Given a basic set of security terms and the scanning software, POS tagging can be 
accomplished with minimal time and personnel resources.  Pruning the tagged terms 
is a manual task, but does not require advanced security expertise and can be 
accomplished in a relatively short time.  The subsequent elicitation activities require 
stakeholder meetings to develop security requirements, but do not require significant 
expertise or training.  Conducting the FMEA analysis will take minor training and 
startup time to determine failure modes, expected effects and appropriate scales to be 
used to calculate the RPN.  However, the process is easy to understand by non-
technical stakeholders and guidance by the requirements engineer makes the FMEA 
analysis a feasible technique.  Additional models and techniques that are currently in 
use by the requirements engineer are not excluded and can also be included in the 
approach are desired.  The development of a security requirements repository to 
improve traceability and reusability as the elicitation approach matures does not 
detract from the feasibility of the proposed solution.  Therefore, the proposed security 
requirements elicitation approach is a feasible alternative to other approaches for 
small, agile organizations. 
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 Summary 4.5
This chapter presented an analysis of POS tagging and the security requirements 
approach.  Sample SRS documents were collected and automated scanning software 
developed for this thesis was used for POS tagging of security terms.   A subset of 
SRS documents with the highest frequency of tagged security terms was analyzed.  
Tagged terms that were redundant or were false positives had tags removed.  Next, 
the activities in the security requirements elicitation approach were undertaken.  
Security requirements that had not been previously identified were elicited and 
developed from all of the SRS documents.  
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5 Conclusions and Future Work 
 Summary 5.1
This thesis describes a solution for eliciting security requirements using POS tagging 
which can be implemented by small, agile organizations.  Resulting security 
requirements are integrated into SRS documents and a security requirements 
repository enables rapid reuse of developed requirements.  Key elements of the 
elicitation solution are (1) identifying security goals, (2) categorizing goals by 
security principle, (3) understanding stakeholder goals to develop preliminary 
requirements and (4) prioritizing security requirements for inclusion into the SRS 
document.  Stakeholder roles, input artifacts, techniques and output artifacts are 
defined for each phase of the solution.  The solution is flexible in order to 
accommodate the needs of small, agile software development organizations but 
outlines a basic structure that can be easily implemented.  The solution takes place at 
the earliest phase of the software development process during requirements elicitation 
in order to reduce cost and rework at later stages of development. 
A POS scanning algorithm was developed as part of the solution to automate 
early discovery of security goals by tagging security terms within a document.  The 
scanning algorithm can be used with individual documents or to scan multiple 
documents at one time.  Review of tagged terms indicates that security terms are 
typically grouped in close proximity and duplicates can be identified and untagged.  
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False positives, or security terms that are not associated with security goals, are also 
manually untagged.  The resulting set of tagged security terms can then be analyzed 
using the proposed solution.  Security requirements were discovered and refined in 
documents obtained from a sample set of publically available SRS documents.  These 
results verify that solution is feasible and can be implemented in small, agile 
organizations. 
 Research Contributions 5.2
Our research provides two major contributions.  The first contribution is the POS 
scanning algorithm.  We use POS tagging to discover security requirements from 
existing requirements artifacts by extracting implied security goals from business 
stakeholders.  POS tagging jump starts the elicitation process and focuses efforts on 
specific areas of the requirements document for further examination.  This approach 
differs from surveyed works that either relies on developing complex security models 
or implementing comprehensive security initiatives.  Requirements engineers can 
have a wide range of security knowledge and expertise to implement the solution 
rather than needing to be security experts.  For small organizations with limited 
resources, this addresses their needs to build security maturity over time rather than 
undertaking comprehensive security initiatives.  By starting with a basic set of 
security terms and understanding of key security principles, POS tagging focuses 
resources on fully understanding security goals.  The second contribution is 
development of a four step process to elicit, analyze, prioritize and document security 
requirements.  A key component of prioritization is the implementation of FMEA 
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analysis which has roots in Six Sigma methodologies.  FMEA analysis has not 
previously be considered as an approach that can be used as part of the requirements 
elicitation, but has advantages in that it is quick, easy to understand by non-technical 
stakeholders and aids in prioritization of security requirements.  RPN results are 
based on ranking risk based on frequency, occurrence and detection each of which 
can be addressed individually to reduce risk.  The solution is flexible and the scope of 
effort can be adjusted to accommodate resources available for a software project.   
Previous works focused on modeling scenarios, addressing specific threats, 
implementing security mechanisms, or developing broad security initiatives.  
However, if stakeholders do no clearly understanding security needs, deriving 
security requirements using these approaches can be a difficult and resource intensive 
exercise.  The security requirements elicitation solution is designed to be integrated 
into the requirements elicitation phase of software development in order to reduce 
costly rework at later stages of development. 
 Suggestions for Future Work 5.3
The focus of this work has been the integration of POS tagging within a security 
requirements elicitation approach.  During evaluation of the solution, we observed 
that additional work in POS tagging is needed.  Frequency of terms, proximity and 
associations between terms may be more significant than developing a large dataset 
of security terms.  Expanding the terminology to include short phrases of related 
terms should also be explored to improve understanding of security goals.  The 
relationship between a combination of terms and association with specific security 
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principles should be explored.  Furthermore, the development of a security 
requirements language using a formal language such as Backus Normal Form (BNF) 
notation to precisely and formally define security requirements and generate a 
reusable repository of security requirements.  Finally, failure modes and effects 
analysis could be used to generate techniques, such as abuser stories, which are 
commonly used with agile development elicitation and modeling techniques.   
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Appendix A 
Characterizing a Small, Agile 
Organization 
A software development company’s requirements engineering processes were studied 
to determine representative characteristics for a small, agile organization.  For the 
sake of anonymity, the company will be referred to as “the company” from this point 
forward. 
 Company Background and Culture A.1
The company has been in existence for roughly ten years starting with a core group of 
developers and entrepreneurs.  The company has been growing quickly over the past 
two years adding key personnel in managerial, marketing, software development, and 
quality assurance positions.  These new positions have been filled with a mix of 
seasoned professionals and well educated computer scientists and engineers. The 
software engineering team consists of the following team roles: 
 requirements engineer 
 software developers 
 quality engineer and testers 
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 marketing 
 customer support and maintenance engineers 
 project manager 
A newly hired IT security manager coordinates with the team on internal security 
measures and provides general security consultation but is not part of the software 
engineering team. 
The company culture is entrepreneurial in nature and communication is very 
open.  Physical office space is at a premium and singly occupied offices are rare. 
Core groups such as developers and testers are all within earshot of each other which 
aids in open verbal communication. Individuals may have several roles creating 
cross-functionality among departments or functional areas.  There is a shared sense of 
purpose and direction that creates a sense of esprit de corps among all. 
 Product Lifecycle A.2
The software products developed by the company are cyclical in nature and revolve 
around a few main “seasons”.  This leads to very short development life cycles and 
tight, unbendable deadlines. A typical project timeframe is about 6 months from 
proposal to delivery.  Many of the products are developed as part of a subcontract 
with mainly one outside developer, but new products developed solely by the 
company are seen as a future trend.   
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 Agile Philosophy A.3
As the company grows, the development team sees the need to introduce formality to 
processes without losing the flexibility that is so much a part of the company culture. 
In addition, the iterative nature of the product lifecycle has led to a movement to 
embrace agile philosophies.  At this point, a specific agile methodology has not been 
chosen to follow and general consensus is to use the best practices from several 
methodologies.  The software engineering team has been increasing their agile 
awareness by attending webinars and through informal research.  Currently, they are 
leaning towards an iterative approach that will fit into the frequent seasonal products 
that they produce. 
 Requirements Process A.4
The requirements process depends on the type of product that is to be developed. 
There are three primary types of products: 
 products developed as part of a contract with another development 
organization 
 products developed as enhancements to existing products 
 new products created and developed solely by the company 
Contracted Products 
Requirements are typically defined prior to contract negotiations.  Minor changes 
may be made during implementation, but requirements are generally not modified.  
 
 
91 
 
Existing Products 
Typically, customers drive the development of requirements using a request for 
proposal (RFP).  The requirements engineer may make a preliminary requirements 
document based on the RFP.  Final requirements are elicited directly with the 
customer in consultation with the requirements engineer. 
New Products 
Requirements are determined by marketing and research in the absence of an existing 
customer.  In this case, stakeholders are all internal, but are from upper management, 
marketing and high-level developers.  Requirements from similar products may be 
used as a starting point when eliciting and developing requirements, but a 
requirements repository has not been implemented.   
 Security Needs A.5
Recently, the company has become more aware of the need to incorporate security 
into all aspects of the business.  Driven initially by systems administration with the 
backing of top management, there has been an effort to educate everyone regarding 
security and to develop security policies.  This effort seems to have trickled into the 
psyche of everyone, including the software development team.  Developers are aware 
of the need to incorporate secure coding practices and have been instituting “best 
practices” into programming.  However, these efforts are not driven by any formal 
processes. 
Systems administration has been tasked with developing an overall security 
roadmap for the company which would include elements such as policy, training, 
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incident response, and disaster recovery.  As the company grows, the need for 
standardized processed is becoming evident.  Standardization should not hinder the 
entrepreneurial nature and culture of the company and will need to be rolled out in a 
continuous manner. Certification or adherence to standards may also be desirable.  
 Development and Collaboration Tools A.6
Open source tools are generally preferred and there are not any formal processes for 
choosing tools.  If a developer, manager or functional unit loosely agrees to use a 
particular tool, they appear to be able to green light its use.  Development is primarily 
managed using Eclipse and software quality assurance (SQA) is trending towards 
Bugzilla.  One tool that is being utilized company-wide is Egroupware
1
, an open 
source business communication tool.  Egroupware consists of modular applications 
that can be implemented as needed.  Key features that are being utilized are general 
communication components such as calendars and email as well as modules for 
ticketing, document management and wikis.   
Ticketing 
A tracker application is used for ticketing for a wide range of functions from general 
management to specific project management tasks.  General management would 
include systems administration, help desk, and operational tasks.  Specific project 
management tasks include setting up developer responsibilities, testing, and ongoing 
project communication.  For a small company, this tool currently meets their needs.  
 
                                                 
1
 http://www.egroupware.org/ 
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Document Management 
There are not any formal document management systems and functional areas have 
document repository space allocated on company servers and individual computers.  
Egroupware does provide for document management, but this feature is not currently 
utilized.  Microsoft Word is the default word processing application and document 
type used for nearly all internal and external documentation.   
Wikis 
Wikis can be created by any member of the organization.  Company policies and 
software development best practices wikis are under development, but 
implementation and usage are ad-hoc at the current time. 
 Summary A.7
The company is small sized, has fast paced development lifecycles and is moving 
towards agile development.  Software engineers are not experts in software security 
and resources are limited to spend additional time on security training and education. 
Therefore, security initiatives including secure software development practices must 
be easy to implement and be developed over time. These characteristics are 
representative for a typical software development organization and are the basis for 
our security requirements elicitation approach that will address the needs of a small, 
agile organization.  
 
 
